Chechnya urban warfare lessons learned pdf

Instead of the anticipated cake walk, Russian forces encountered heavy resistance from Chechen forces armed with large quantities of antitank weapons. The Russian attack was repulsed with shockingly high Russian casualties. It took another two months of heavy fighting and adapting Russian tactics to finally capture Grozny. The Chechens monitored Russian movement through the city using small, hand-held, off-the-shelf Motorola radios. They intentionally drew the Russians into urban canyons where they could ambush them and reduce Russian combat advantages.

Intelligence Limited accurate maps Underestimated threat Cultural arrogance Did not conduct proper. Chechen fighters rarely wore military uniforms and could easily blend into the city population. The locals were an excellent information source for the Chechens; they would routinely report Russian movements using small hand-held radios and couriers.

Young women were particularly useful intelligence agents as they could easily move throughout the city. Airpower Hampered by poor weather Little direct support of ground troops Used free-fire zones Employed laser-guided bombs.

Why Chechnya ? These graphics depict the Chechen counterattack on New Years Eve The Russians were moving in a single column through the city with no supporting infantry. The Chechens attacked the front and rear vehicles. Once they were disabled, the other vehicles had little room to maneuver. The Chechens then moved down the line destroying the remaining Russian vehicles. The Russian forces panicked and could not launch a counterattack. The Chechens made use of and sometimes discarded the often plentiful stock of captured Russian equipment.

The Russians normally did not move at night or during periods of heavy fog while operating in the city. The Chechens used fog to mask their movement. They also keyed on the Russian use of smoke as an obscurant, taking it as an indicator of Russian movement. The Chechens would fire into the smoke with positive effect during Russian displacements. The Chechens centered their eight man subgroups armor hunterkiller teamssquad equivalent on the RPG Chechnyas national weapon.

The sniper was also often employed as a spotter. In the conduct of armor and personnel ambushes, the Chechens configured their forces into man groups. These were further broken down into three man groups platoons. These platoons were further broken down into three equal-sized teams of six to eight fighters each squads.

The man unit company had a mortar 82mm crew in support with at least two tubes per crew. The Chechens did not move by flanking maneuvers against the Russians but instead incorporated chess-like maneuvers to hit them.

The Chechens only occupied the lower levels of multistory buildings to avoid casualties from rockets and air-delivered munitions coming through the upper levels. One man platoon comprised the killer team and set up in three positions along the target avenue. They had responsibility for destroying whatever column entered their site. The other two man platoons set up in the buildings at the assumed entry points to the ambush site.

They had responsibility for sealing off the ambush entry escape or interdict efforts to reinforce the ambushed unit. The Chechens utilized hugging techniques to reduce casualties from indirect fires.

They would set up positions within 25 to a maximum of meters of Russian positions in order to render Russian artillery and rocket support ineffective. The primary communications device used by the Chechens was a small hand-held Motorola radio. It was used at all levels below Headquarters national equivalent. At this higher level they had access to INMARSAT for communications with the outside world but kept these communications to a minimum because of the monetary cost involved.

The Chechens had a ratio of about six combatants to each Motorola radiobut had they been able to afford more radios they would have issued every fighter one during the conduct of urban operations. The Chechens did not use any encryption or separate tactical nets. They maintained communications security by using their native language. Every Chechen could speak Russian but few Russians understood Chechen.

The standard Russian Rocket-Propelled Grenade RPG warhead needed four rounds on target to penetrate a tankthe Chechens altered the RPG-7 round by removing the detonator cap and increasing the explosive components in such a way that they could penetrate a tanks to include the T armor and blow the turret off in one shot. The Chechens found the RPG to be an extremely effective weapon in urban warfare.

Its simple use and wide availability earned it the nickname The National Weapon of Chechnya. The Chechens employed the RPG against a wide range of targets, including bunkers, vehicles, personnel, and buildings. The RPG was successfully fired from multiple launchers against Russian armor. The Chechens targeted the thinly armored areas in the rear, top, and sides of Russian vehicles. Urban Sniping Widely used by both sides in Grozny Second most deadly urban weapon for the Chechens Used as scouts as much as for sniping Russians employed in support of infantry; Chechens also depl oyed independently Best source of tactical intelligence in urban area.

The most effective Chechen weapon system employed against pure Russian infantry was the SVD sniper rifle employed by a trained Chechen sniper. The SVD was not only effective as a casualty producer, but also as a psychological weapon that reduced morale among Russian ground troops.

The Russians diverted significant combat power to search for Chechen snipers but were unsuccessful. Despite tactical success in the streets of Grozny, the Chechens had several weaknesses.

The Chechens greatest weakness was their inability to conduct an extensive engagement. The small size of the Chechen units, coupled with their limited ammunition supplies, caused them to avoid large-scale battles. The Russians discovered that the Chechens could be defeated by forcing the rebels into drawn-out engagements, surrounding their positions, and using overwhelming fire support.

The Chechens were unwilling to sustain the level of battlefield losses the Russians experienced and would retreat following a strong Russian counterattack. The Chechens are a clan-based culture that only bands together to fight foreign invasion.

Without a common enemy, the Chechens often turn against each other. The Chechen General Staff did not have complete control over all Chechen forces. Many were independent groups that decided themselves when, where, and how long they would remain in combat. The Russians never learned to successfully exploit these vulnerabilities and simply viewed all Chechens as terrorists. This is an example of possible Chechen deception or information warfare. It was found on a Chechen Web site and shows several Chechens in possession of Stinger anti-aircraft systems.

The Chechens may or may not have working Stinger systems, but the possibility of their having them affected the way Russians employed their aircraft during the conflict. Lessons from Chechnya The urban environment leveled the playing field between forces Detailed planning was essential Prior urban warfare training was critical to battlefield success Russians did not understand unique aspects of urban warfare urban canyon, RPGs, etc.

Russians failed to understand cultural aspects. The first thing you must doand it is priority number oneis study the people. You must know the psychological makeup of not only the combatants you might face but that of the local populace as well. Understand your enemy in detailbut not only from a military and political perspectivebut also from a cultural viewpoint.

If you underestimate the importance of this, you are on a road to decisive defeat. The Russiansgiven years of conflict with the Chechenshave not learned this lesson. It is a matter of understanding your foes mentality. While it is unlikely the United States will conduct an operation similar to the Russian invasion of Chechnya, there are lessons of value that can be learned.

Victory in the streets of Grozny was based on troops ability to withstand long periods of intense combat with limited resupply and rest.

A significant Russian failure was their inability to conduct effective small unit infantry operations in a MOUT environment.

While the Russians captured Grozny in January , the city is now unlivable due to the massive destruction caused by Russian artillery. The battle of Grozny illustrates the type of urban insurgency that may dominate the 21st-century battlefield. Understanding the Chechen strategy, tactics, and weapons is essential in preparing U.

Open navigation menu. Close suggestions Search Search. User Settings. Skip carousel. Carousel Previous. Carousel Next. What is Scribd? Explore Ebooks. Bestsellers Editors' Picks All Ebooks. Explore Audiobooks. Bestsellers Editors' Picks All audiobooks. Explore Magazines. But for the young men who spent New Year's Eve attacking the city, Grozny - which in Russian means "terrible" or "menacing" - lived up to its name. At the cost of numerous casualties and severe damage to the city, the Russians eventually succeeded, but their victory proved short-lived.

Five years later to the day, Russian troops were once again battling rebel forces in Grozny's streets. A new RAND report, Russia's Chechen Wars Lessons from Urban Combat , examines both Russian and rebel tactics and operations in Grozny and other Chechen towns and villages throughout this conflict, focusing on how and why the combatants' approaches did and did not change over time.

Failure to prepare for urban combat was a key error the Russians made in both Chechnya wars, but it was not the only one. Hampered by poor training and supplies, decrepit equipment, and abysmal planning, the Russian troops who fought the war presented a stark picture of how much this once-great force had deteriorated. The war also demonstrated how poorly Russian military organizational structures functioned when disparate forces were called upon to work together.

The more recent war, which began in the fall of and continues today, however, provides a more nuanced picture, in which real improvements, particularly in planning, force coordination, basic tactics, and public relations are evident, but a wide range of other difficulties remain. According to Oliker, the key mistake the Russian military made between the wars was in drawing the wrong lesson from urban combat: not only that it should be avoided, but that it could be avoided, and therefore required no preparation.

When this belief proved false, the Russians found themselves making the same mistakes in the same streets that they had made five years before. Both times, Russian failings were exacerbated by Chechen advantages, among these, the fact that the Chechens knew their cities and were prepared to defend them. As the Chechen war sputters on, it seems likely that, given time and determination, the Russians can "succeed" in Chechnya. But to do so, they must choose between destroying the region, settling in for an extended and bloody occupation, or some equally unpleasant combination of the two.